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Abstract 
While some of the modern performance measures used in managerial accounting rely on cash flow based figures 
others try to take advantage of the information content of accounting figures. However, whether the additional 
information content in the accrual components of earnings improves the internal performance measurement is an 
open empirical question. To shed light on this question, I examine the correlation between operating cash flows 
and earnings with firm’s total shareholder returns. Using fixed firm effects regression methods for a large sample 
of German listed firms covering some 5,000 firm years, the analysis shows that generally operating cash flow and 
earnings  are  both  positively  correlated  with  total  shareholder  return.  However,  with  increasing  information 
asymmetry earnings become less correlated with the firm’s stock market performance and operating cash flows 
dominate earnings in explaining total shareholder return (and vice versa). These results suggest that, the infor-
mation content of accounting figures is only relevant in settings characterized by low information asymmetries 
and, thus, there is no one-size-fits-all performance measure for managerial accounting purposes.  
Keywords: Accounting figures, performance measures, total shareholder return, managerial accounting 
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1.  Introduction 
Rappaport’s shareholder value approach claims that managerial decisions are to be judged 
against their effect on shareholder wealth, i.e. their impact on the firm’s stock market per-
formance (e.g. Rappaport 1981, 1998). Adopting that view the (only) relevant performance 
measure for managerial accounting purposes is total shareholder return to be earned by in-
vestments in the firm’s stocks. However, from the perspective of optimal incentive design us-
ing total shareholder return (TSR) as a performance measure has a serious drawback, since it 
is well-known that a substantial part of the variation in TSR is due to exogenous events be-
yond control of the management. Thus, although Rappaports shareholder value approach 
seems widely accepted today, there is an ongoing debate about appropriate internal perfor-
mance measures to be taken to evaluate managerial decisions and to be used in managerial 
accounting.  
From an agency perspective, optimal incentives rely on performance metrics that use i) vari-
ables that are clearly aligned with the objectives of the firm (i.e. shareholder value) and ii) 
variables that measure the outcome of managerial decisions sufficiently well (e.g. Kaplan and 
Atkinson, 1998). In particular, there should be a direct link between managerial decisions and 
the performance variable. Now, many consulting firms have invented specific performance 
measures with the common goal to provide a metric that measures the outcome of manage-
ment decisions, i.e. the firm’s operating performance, in such a way that internal perfor-
mance as measured by the metric is highly correlated with the firm’s stock market perfor-
mance.  
While all these performance measures have a common goal, there is substantial heterogenei-
ty with respect to their structure. For instance, there are on the one hand, cash flow based 
figures like Cash Value Added (CVA) promoted by the Boston Consulting Group and, on the 
other hand, accounting based figures like Economic Value Added (EVA), which is a trademark 
by Stern Stewart.1 From a general management perspective both performance metrics, i.e. 
CVA and EVA, rely on a common premise: They are based on some measure of operating 
performance which is compared to the costs of the resources required to generate the per-
formance. From an accounting perspective, however, CVA and EVA represent two polar 
                                                       
1 Boston consulting Group promotes a performance measure called CVA that is basically an extension of Cash 
Flow Return on Investment (CFROI). Initially, Ottosson and Weissenrieder (1996) and Weissenrieder (1997) pioneered 
a slightly different performance measure that also relies on cash flows and is also called Cash Value Added. Young 
and O’Byrne (2001) discuss the performance measure EVA. McKinsey also promotes an accounting figure based 
performance measure called Economic Profit (EP). See Ryan and Trahan (1999, 2001), Claes (2008), Erasmus (2008), 
or Friedl and Kettenring (2009) for a general discussion of value-based performance measures. - 3 - 
approaches to measure operating performance: While CVA measures operating performance 
in terms of (operating) cash flows, EVA measures operating performance in terms of ac-
counting profits. Thus, while CVA relies on cash flow based figures EVA tries to take ad-
vantage of the information content of accounting figures. However, whether the additional 
information  content in the  accrual  components of  earnings improves  the  internal  perfor-
mance measurement is an open empirical question.2 
To shed light on this question, I examine the correlation of operating cash flows and earnings 
with firm’s total shareholder returns. Using fixed firm effects regression methods for a large 
sample of German listed firms covering some 5,000 firm years, the analysis shows that gen-
erally operating cash flow and earnings are both positively correlated with total shareholder 
return. However, with increasing information asymmetry earnings become less correlated 
with the firm’s stock market performance, and operating cash flow dominates earnings in 
explaining total shareholder return (and vice versa). These results suggest that from a mana-
gerial accounting perspective the information content of financial accounting figures is only 
valuable in settings characterized by low information asymmetries and, thus, there is no one-
size-fits-all performance measure for managerial accounting purposes. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the hypotheses and 
discusses the methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data set 
and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and section 
5 concludes.  
 
2.  Hypotheses and methodology 
This section develops the hypotheses and introduces the methodology used in the empirical 
analysis. 
2.1.  Development of key hypotheses 
The central problem examined in this study is the question whether the additional infor-
mation content in the accrual components of earnings figures make earnings figures superior 
to cash flow figures in explaining a firm’s stock market return and thus whether accounting 
                                                       
2 This question becomes particularly interesting, if one notes that the information content of the accrual compo-
nent, although regulated by accounting standards, involves a high degree of subjectivity which has to be judged 
by the management itself (e.g. Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow, 1996; Sloan, 1996; Warfield et al., 1995).  - 4 - 
figures represent the preferred starting point for a performance metric used in managerial 
accounting.3 
A naïve person might argue that cash flow figures representing the periodical surplus of 
cash generated by a firm should be a good predictor of its stock market performance. This 
view, which is in parts supported by proponents of the discounted cash flow method of firm 
valuation, hypothesizes a positive correlation between a firm’s cash flow performance and its 
stock market performance.4 
One might, however, argue that cash flows are a rather noisy signal of actual firm perfor-
mance and add that accounting figures with their accrual component aim to provide addition-
al  information  beyond  the  information  provided  by  pure  cash flow  figures  (e.g.  Dechow, 
1994).5 This fact is known as the informativeness of accounting figures and the central idea is 
to evenly distribute (accounting) profits over a projects lifetime. With this idea in mind, the 
accountant might argue that accounting figures might outperform pure cash flow figures in 
explaining a firm’s stock market performance (see Ball and Brown (1968) or Dechow (1994) and 
Vorstius (2004) for German evidence). This view is summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Accounting figures outperform pure cash flow figures in explaining a firm’s stock 
market performance. 
 
While there might be good reasons to argue that in theory accounting figures might be supe-
rior to cash flow figures in explaining a firm’s stock market performance, from a practical 
point of view there are several obstacles for this argument to stand an empirical test. The 
main impediments are information asymmetries between management and shareholders and 
various incentives for earnings management by executives (e.g. Sloan, 1996).6  
                                                       
3 There is a substantial amount of literature discussing value-based performance measures, e.g. Stewart (1994), 
Stern, Stewart and Chew (1995), Grant (1996), O’Byrne (1996), Chen and Dodd (1997, 2001), Biddle et al. (1997, 1999), 
Kleinman (1999), KPMG Consulting (1999), Ryan and Trahan (1999, 2007), Worthington and West (2001), Young and 
O’Byrne (2001), Keef and Roush (2002), Lovata and Costigan (2002), Athanassakos (2007). My study, however, differs 
in that I focus on the empirical question whether the additional information embedded in the accrual component 
of accounting earnings improve the alignment of accounting figures and a firm’s stock market performance and 
derives implications for the optimal design of (value-based) performance measures. See Pfaff (2004) for a discus-
sion of the literature discussing the problem from a theoretical perspective.  
4 See Koller et al. (2005) for a discussion of the discounted cash flow method. 
5 The accrual component of accounting figures is the difference between accounting earnings and operating cash 
flows (e.g. Dechow et al., 1995 or Sloan, 1996).  
6 See Lev (1989), Dechow et al. (1995) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) for a general discussion of earnings manage-
ment. - 5 - 
Keeping in mind the informativeness of accounting figures perspective, it seems reasonable 
to argue that with increasing information asymmetry, the additional information embedded 
in the accrual component becomes more value relevant. This view is summarized in the fol-
lowing hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2.a: As information asymmetries increase, accounting figures become even more domi-
nant in explaining a firm’s stock market return (compared to pure cash flow figures). 
 
However, as information asymmetries increase incentives for opportunistic earnings man-
agement will increase, since punishment of opportunistic behavior by outside shareholders 
is less likely (Günther et al., 2009). Accordingly, discretionary options embedded in the accru-
al component of accounting figures become more valuable for management, and from the 
perspective  of  shareholders,  the  information  value  of  accruals  fades  away.  This  view  is 
summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2.b: As information asymmetries increase, accounting figures become less relevant in 
explaining a firm’s stock market return (compared to pure cash flow figures). 
 
Obviously, hypotheses 2.b represents a competing hypothesis to hypothesis 2.a and it re-
mains an open empirical question which of the two will stand the test. 
2.2.  Methodology 
To examine the above hypotheses I conduct an empirical analysis in which I regress a firm’s 
stock market performance on cash flow and accounting figures and various controls, i.e. I 
estimate a range of variants of the following empirical model: 
  Rit = α α α α + β β β β1 1 1 1 x EARit + β β β β2 x CFit + γ γ γ γ1 x K1it + … + γ γ γ γn x Knit + ε ε ε εit    (1)  
where  
Rit = stock market performance of firm i in year t, 
EARit = (standardized) accounting earnings of firm i in year t, 
CFit = (standardized) cash flow of firm i in year t, and  - 6 - 
K1it, …, Knit = various firm- and time-specific controls.7  
Model (1) is a straight-forward generalization of the well-known value relevance models to 
study the informativeness of earnings figures (e.g. Warfiled et al., 1995; Pronobis et al., 2008 or 
Günther et al., 2009), where instead of using EAR only, I use EAR and CF (simultaneously) as 
explanatory variables. 
Value relevance studies generally are interested in the cross-sectional informativeness of earn-
ings figures, and thus rely on (pooled) cross-sectional analyses. Instead I am interested in the 
firm-specific value relevance of a performance metric. Accordingly, I use panel data anal-
yses, more specifically two-way fixed effects regression models with fixed firm- and year-
effects.8 My firm-specific effects control for any (unobservable) firm heterogeneity either due 
to the management style, its business model or even its accounting behavior (see Pronobis et 
al. (2008) for a similar approach). My period-specific effects control for any change in the 
overall valuation level in the stock market.  
Moreover, note that value-relevance studies rarely use any controls in their analyses (e.g. 
Warfiled et al., 1995 or Pronobis et al., 2008). However, there are numerous studies that show 
that there are various firm characteristics that might help to explain some variation in the 
firm’s stock market performance. For instance, Fama and French (1993) show that beside the 
classical  CAPM  β-coefficient,  firm-size  and  market-to-book  ratio  add  explanatory  power 
when explaining a firm’s stock market performance. Thus, I estimate both a simple value-
relevance specification 
  Rit = α α α α + β β β β1 1 1 1 x EARit + β β β β2 x CFit + ε ε ε εit              (2)  
as well as an extended value-relevance specification 
  Rit = α α α α + β β β β1 1 1 1 x EARit + β β β β2 x CFit + γ γ γ γ1 x BETAit + γ γ γ γ2 x SIZEit + γ γ γ γ3 x MTBit  
      + γ γ γ γ4 x ETPit + γ γ γ γ5 x LEVit + γ γ γ γ6 x DOMINATEDit + ε ε ε εit      (3)  
where I follow Günther et al. (2009) and control for firm-risk (BETA), firm size (SIZE), valua-
tion levels (market-to-book ratio MTB and earnings-to-price ratio ETP) and leverage (LEV). 
Moreover, I also control for differences in ownership structures (DOMINATED), since own-
ership structures are often claimed to affect a firm’s stock market performance (e.g. Holder-
ness, 2003). 
                                                       
7 Model (1) aims to explain a relative performance figure. Thus, I use relative figures as explanatory variables. I 
standardize my accounting earnings and cash flow figures by deflating them with total assets of the firm. 
8 See Wooldridge (2002) for a discussion of cross-sectional and panel data analyses. - 7 - 
To test my key hypotheses I run a range of variants of the above specifications. While hy-
pothesis 1 is easily analyzed by estimating variants of specifications (2) and (3) on all firms, 
testing the two polar hypotheses 2.a. and 2.b is much more difficult. In this study I adopt a 
straight-forward  but  rather  simple  two-step  approach.  In  the  first  step,  I  define  various 
dummy variables proxying information asymmetries and use each of these variables to split 
my  sample  into  two  subsamples.  This  procedure  results  in  various  pairs  of  subsamples, 
where one subsample is characterized by low information asymmetry and the other by high 
information asymmetry. In the second step, I estimate the extended value-relevance specifi-
cation on each of the subsamples and compare the coefficients β1 and β2 as well as their sta-
tistical significance for each pair of subsamples.9  
 
3.  Data set and descriptive statistic 
This section describes the data selection process, introduces the variables and provides some 
descriptive statistics. 
3.1.  Sample description and data sources 
The sample is derived as follows: I start from all German firms listed in the EU-regulated 
General Standard of Deutsche Börse AG, which is the dominant German stock exchange. The-
se firms are the constituents of the broadest German stock index, called Composite DAX 
(CDAX). My sample period is from 1998 to 2008. This first step results in 885 firms and 9,735 
possible firm year observations. 
Then, I follow the standard approach of related studies and remove all financial firms from 
my sample, since their accounting behavior differs significantly. I use the Industry Classifica-
tion Benchmark (ICB) classification of Dow Jones Indexes and FTSE as provided by Thomson 
ONE Banker to identify financial firms. This procedure results in 746 firms with 8,206 possi-
ble firm year observations. 
For these 746 firms I collect accounting data and stock price information from Thomson 
Worldscope and Datastream and ownership data from Thomson ONE Banker. This proce-
dure results in a panel-data set in which I remove two sources of inconsistencies: First, I re-
move all firm years, where the corresponding fiscal year has less than 300 calendar days or 
                                                       
9 Alternative econometric approaches are so-called stability tests like Chow’s breakpoint test. These methods are 
not applied here, because their interpretation is not as straight-forward as the results of the approach adopted in 
here. - 8 - 
more than 400 calendar days, since it is unclear how to annualize the corresponding account-
ing and cash flow figures.10 Second, I remove all firm years where the corresponding fiscal 
year ends in the first six month of the calendar year, since more than one half of the operat-
ing activities took place in the year before.11 The Table 1 below illustrates the sample selec-
tion procedure and the distribution of firm year observation with various levels of available 
data over time. 
 
YEAR 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
# Firms 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 9,735
# Non-Financial Firms 746 746 746 746 746 746 746 746 746 746 746 8,206
# Non-Financial Firms 
with TSR and regular fiscal year
290 357 459 532 485 461 440 434 429 435 424 4,746
# Non-Financial Firms 
with TSR, regular fiscal year
and data on EAR and CF
280 337 422 502 469 442 425 423 420 429 416 4,565
# Non-Financial Firms 
with TSR, regular fiscal year,
and data on EAR and CF as well 
as other controls
190 180 154 147 168 232 268 254 251 243 257 2,344
 
The table illustrates the sample selection procedure that starts from all German firms listed in the 
EU-regulated General Standard of Deutsche Börse AG at least once during the sample period from 
1998 to 2008. In the analysis, I adopt the standard procedure and consider only non-financial firms. 
For these firms I collect accounting data and stock price information from Thomson Worldscope 
and Datastream and ownership data from Thomson ONE Banker. Finally, I remove non-regular 
fiscal years. Variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. 
Table 1: Sample description 
 
3.2.  Variable selection 
In the analysis I use several variables which are explained below. All data are collected from 
Thomson databases (Worldscope, Datastream and ONE Banker). 
 
Endogenous variables: The key endogenous variable in my analysis is total shareholder re-
turn (TSR), which measures shareholder’s return from investment in the firm’s stock as the 
                                                       
10 This might either be the case when a) a firm changes its fiscal year end or b) there is a data problem in the data-
base.  
11 Otherwise this would produce problems when I use period-fixed effects in my regression analyses. - 9 - 
sum of capital gains plus dividends of the stock. I measure TSR over a 12 month period start-
ing four months after the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year. Note that firms general-
ly issue their annual report within two to four months after the end of the fiscal year.12 Thus, 
the four-month-lag procedure, which is illustrated in Figure 1, allows the stock market to 
internalize accounting and cash flow information from the annual report.13 
 
t0  
(begin of fiscal year) 
t0 + 4 month  t1  
(end of   fiscal year) 
t1 +4 month 
Fiscal year 
Period to measure TSR 
 
The figure illustrates the four-month-lag procedure to calculate total shareholder return. The ap-
proach allows investors to internalize all relevant earnings and cash flow information from annual 
reports released within two to four months after the end of the fiscal year. 
Figure 1: Four-month-lag procedure to calculate total shareholder return 
 
In robustness tests I challenge my results by using three other endogenous variables. First, I 
use a second total shareholder return measure, which is calculated over a 12 month period, 
starting 5 months after the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year. Second, I use two ex-
cess return measures calculated as total shareholder return (calculated based on the four-
month-lag and five-month-lag procedure) minus the return of a buy-and-hold strategy in-
vesting in the CDAX.  
 
Exogenous variables: The central exogenous variables are cash flow and accounting perfor-
mance. Cash flow performance is measured by operating cash flow. Accounting performance 
is measured by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). To estimate their impact on stock 
market performance, both performance measures are deflated by average total assets of the 
                                                       
12 While German law requires firms to issue annual reports within a four months period, the German code of 
good governance (German Corporate Governance Code) recommends releasing the report within three months 
time. 
13 Warfield et al. (1995) use a three-month-lag approach for US firms. However, the release time for German firms 
is slightly longer that for US firms. Accordingly, Günther et al. (2009) use a four month-lag approach and Pronobis 
et al. (2009) use even a five-month-lag approach. - 10 - 
firm in the corresponding firm year.14 The cash flow performance measure is denoted as CF, 
the accounting measure as EAR. 
Besides that, I use several other controls. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as logarithm of 1 plus 
total assets. To control for the current level of firm value, I use two variables: MTB measures 
the  market-to-book  ratio  of  equity  and  ETP  measures  the current  earnings-to-price  ratio. 
Since CF and EAR measure firm performance but TSR measures performance of an equity 
investment, I also use leverage (LEV) defined as total debt deflated by total assets as an addi-
tional control. Finally, to account for heterogeneity in ownership structures, I define a dum-
my variable DOMINATED, which takes the value 1 if the firm’s free float is lower than 50%. 
 
Variables splitting the sample into subsamples: To examine the hypotheses 2.a and 2.b I de-
fine four dummy variables that allow me to split the sample into subsamples. First, I define a 
dummy variable MCAP, which takes the value 1 if the firm has an above median market 
capitalization in the particular year. Second, I define dummy variable RND, which takes the 
value 1 if the firm has positive RnD expenditures in the particular year. Thirdly, I define a 
dummy variable INTANG, which takes the value 1 if the firm has an asset structure with an 
above median fraction of intangible assets in the particular year. Finally, I define DOMI-
NATED as explained above. All four dummy variables proxy information asymmetries aris-
ing from firm size and complexity as well as from external monitoring. Specifically, while the 
first three dummy variables aim to proxy firm size and complexity the forth variable proxies 
external monitoring. 
3.3.  Descriptive statistics 
An analysis of the correlation of operating performance and shareholder returns must cover 
boom and recession phases (see Pronobis et al., 2008). As Figure 2 illustrates, my sample peri-
od (1998 to 2008) covers both: the new economy boom phase as well as its burst and the 
boom phase 2004 to 2007, as well as the first part of the credit crises. 
 
 
                                                       
14 As usual, average total assets are calculated as the arithmetic mean of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal 


















































































   
The figure illustrates the development of the German CDAX index during the sample period. The 
index represents all German firms listed in the EU-regulated General Standard of Deutsche Börse 
AG the dominant German stock exchange. 









1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
   EAR (median)    CF (median)
 
The  figure  illustrates  the  development  of  standardized  accounting  earnings  EAR  (calculated  as 
EBIT deflated by average total assets) and standardized operating cash flow CFO (calculated as op-
erating cash flow deflated by average total assets) measured in term of median values over all 
firms. Variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. 
Figure 3: Development of standardized accounting earnings and operating cash flows  
 - 12 - 
These cycles are also reflected in the development of firms’ earnings and cash flows. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3, where median vales of EAR and CF are reported for each year of the 
sample period. Moreover, the figure illustrates that standardized cash flows are larger than 
standardized earnings throughout the sample period. This difference however, often called 
accruals, varies over time. It is particularly small in boom phases (2000, 2004 and 2006) and 
particularly large in 2002, after the bust of the dot-com era (e.g. Gegenfurtner et al., 2009). De-
tails on the development of EAR and CF are found in Table 7 in the appendix. 
Table 2 then reports descriptive statistics on all key variables. In particular, the table reports 
coefficients of correlation for standardized earnings EAR and standardized cash flows CF 
with total shareholder return (TSR): In line with hypothesis 1 the coefficient of correlation for 
standardized  accounting  earnings  EAR  is  positive  and  highly  significant.  Moreover,  it  is 
higher than the coefficient of correlation for standardized cash flows CF, although it is inter-
esting to observe that the coefficient for CF is also highly significant, which is in line with the 
naïve view. 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Observations
TSR 0.14 0.01 4,648
EAR 0.02 0.06 0.28 *** 5,191
CF 0.05 0.07 0.25 *** 5,237
ACCRUALS -0.03 -0.02 0.14 *** 5,160
BETA 0.67 0.60 0.09 *** 3,306
SIZE 5.05 4.77 0.02 5,299
MTB 2.59 1.59 0.11 *** 4,933
ETP -0.22 0.08 0.03 ** 4,861
LEV 0.24 0.16 0.01 5,293




The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. All variables 
are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. The second and third column report mean and 
media values, respectively. The fourth column reports individual correlations with total sharehold-
er return (TSR). Statistical significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level, and 10%-level is indicated by ***, 
**, and *, respectively. The last column reports the individually the number of observations within 
the sample of relevant firms. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
While this result is a first indication in favor of hypotheses 1, the figures reported in Table 2 
are  obviously  only  univariate,  pooled  cross-sectional  coefficients.  Therefore,  I  conduct  a 
more detailed econometric analysis in the following section.    - 13 - 
 
4.  Empirical results 
This section presents results of the empirical analysis. I use two-way fixed effects regression 
methods, i.e. regression models with fixed firm and fixed period effects to account for unob-
servable  firm-specific  and  period-specific  heterogeneity.  To  circumvent  endogeneity  con-
cerns I lag most of my controls in my regression specifications. 
Section 4.1. examines hypothesis 1. Therefore, I estimate variants of my value-relevance spec-
ifications (2) and (3) on the set of all firms in my sample. These are my base-case regressions. 
Section 4.2 splits the sample using three dummy variables proxying firm size and complexi-
ty. I estimate variants of my extended value-relevance specification (3) on each of the six 
subsamples and compare coefficients and significance levels for each pair of subsamples. 
Section 4.3 splits the sample using the ownership dummy variable to proxy external moni-
toring. Again, I estimate variants of my extended value-relevance specification (3) on each of 
the subsamples, and compare coefficients and significance levels. Finally, Section 4.4 reports 
results from various robustness tests.  
4.1.  Base-case regression 
To examine hypothesis 1, I estimate variants of my value-relevance specifications (2) and (3) 
on the set of all firms in my sample. The results are reported in Table 3, where results of the 
simple (extended) value-relevance specifications are reported in Panel A (Panel B).  
Panel A reports results from three specifications. In the first (second) specification standard-
ized accounting earnings EAR (standardized cash flows CF) are significantly positively cor-
related with the endogenous variable TSR. These results are supported by specification three, 
where both variables (EAR and CF) are significantly positively correlated with the endoge-
nous variable TSR. Moreover, note that adj. R2 improves only marginally when adding one 
variable to an existing specification.  
Panel B also reports results from three specifications. The results of these three extended val-
ue-relevance specifications are qualitatively similar to the ones of the simple value-relevance 
specifications reported in Panel A. Overall, these results do not support hypothesis 1 claim-
ing that accounting figures will outperform pure cash flow figures in explaining a firm’s 
stock market performance. 





Constant 0.01 (0.76) -0.04 (-4.86) *** -0.02 (-2.20) **
EAR 0.98 (13.6) *** 0.65 (6.05) ***






Constant 1.46 (6.78) *** 1.42 (6.56) *** 1.40 (6.44) ***
EAR 0.76 (5.78) *** 0.51 (3.04) ***
CF 0.98 (5.29) *** 0.51 (2.15) **
BETA(-1) 0.03 (0.91) 0.03 (0.85) 0.03 (0.90)
SIZE(-1) -0.26 (-7.15) *** -0.26 (-7.22) *** -0.26 (-7.02) ***
MTB(-1) 0.00 (0.67) 0.00 (0.57) 0.00 (0.59)
ETP(-1) -0.06 (-2.68) *** -0.07 (-2.99) *** -0.06 (-2.85) ***
LEV(-1) 0.37 (2.65) *** 0.44 (3.12) *** 0.40 (2.84) ***
















0.357 0.355 0.358  
The table reports coefficients and t-values of the base-case regressions explaining firms’ total share-
holder return. Panel A reports results of three simple two-way fixed effects value-relevance specifi-
cations. Panel B extends these specifications for various lagged controls and the ownership dummy 
variable DOMINATED. Variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. All specifica-
tions include period- and firm-fixed effects. t-values (reported in parentheses) are White-robust. 
Statistical significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level, and 10%-level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respec-
tively.  
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4.2.  Regression on subsamples proxying firm complexity 
To examine hypotheses 2a and b I define various dummy variables, split my sample along 
each of the dummy variables and estimate the extended value-relevance specification (3) 
using two-way fixed effects models on each pair of subsamples.  
In this section I use three dummy variables which proxy firm size and complexity. The first 
variable, MCAP, measures whether a firm’s market capitalization is below or above median 
in a particular year. The second variable, RND, measures whether a firm has positive RnD 
expenditures in a particular year. Finally, the third variable, INTANG, measures whether a 
firm has an asset structure with below or above median fraction of intangible assets. The 
results of these six regressions analyses are reported in Table 4: Panel A (B, C) report results 
from the regression analysis splitting the sample along MCAP (RND, INTANG). 
The results are remarkably similar over all three pairs of subsamples: While standardized 
accounting earnings EAR are significantly positively correlated with the endogenous varia-
ble TSR in the low information asymmetry setting, standardized cash flows CF are not. A 
completely opposite picture emerges in the high information asymmetry setting: Here stand-
ardized cash flows CF are significantly positively correlated with the endogenous variable 
TSR, but standardized accounting earnings EAR are not.15 
These results corroborate hypothesis 2.b, claiming that with increasing information asymme-
tries,  accounting  figures  become  less  relevant  in  explaining  a  firm’s  stock  market  return 
compared to pure cash flow figures.16 
 
 
                                                       
15 Note that in the high information asymmetry setting adj. R2 is substantially higher. Additional analyses reveal 
that this does not affect the results discussed above. 
16 The internal resource hypothesis of Kumar and Krishnan (2008) provides an alternative perspective on these results. - 16 - 
Subsample
Dep. Variable:
EAR 0.84 (3.19) *** 0.19 (0.80)








EAR 0.67 (2.80) *** 0.12 (0.45)








EAR 0.61 (2.63) *** 0.28 (0.89)










Panel C: Two-way fixed effects panel regressions on asset-structure subsamples
Firms with below 
median intangibles








Panel B: Two-way fixed effects panel regressions on RnD-subsamples







Panel A: Two-way fixed effects panel regressions on size-subsamples





The table reports coefficients and t-values of regressions explaining firms’ total shareholder return 
on various complexity subsamples. Panel A splits the sample along firm size (measured in terms of 
market cap). Panel B distinguishes between firms with positive and zero research and development 
expenses. Panel C splits the sample in firms with below and above median intangible assets (deflat-
ed by average total assets). Variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. All specifi-
cations include controls used in the extended base-case regressions, period- and firm-fixed effects. 
t-values  (reported  in  parentheses)  are  White-robust.  Statistical  significance  at  the  1%-level,  5%-
level, and 10%-level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
Table 4: Regressions on complexity subsamples 
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4.3.  Regression in subsamples proxying monitoring of shareholders 
To gain further insights I also use the ownership dummy variable DOMINATED to split the 
sample into two subsamples. DOMINATED is presumed to proxy for monitoring abilities of 
shareholders (e.g. Grossmann and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishney, 1986 and Holderness, 2003 
for a survey). The results of the regressions analyses are reported in Table 5. 
The result is remarkably similar to the above results: While standardized accounting earn-
ings EAR are significantly positively correlated with the endogenous variable TSR in the low 
information asymmetry setting, standardized cash flows CF are not. In contrast, in the high 
information asymmetry setting standardized cash flows CF are significantly positively corre-





EAR 0.34 (1.35) 0.51 (1.97) **













The table reports coefficients and t-values of regressions explaining firms’ total shareholder return 
on two subsamples, distinguishing between widely held and dominated firms. Firms are defined to 
be dominated when free float is smaller than 50%. Otherwise, firms are defined to be widely held. 
Other variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the appendix. All specifications include con-
trols used in the extended base-case regressions, period- and firm-fixed effects. t-values (reported 
in parentheses) are White-robust. Statistical significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level, and 10%-level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
Table 5: Regressions on free float subsamples 
 
Again, these results corroborate hypothesis 2.b claiming that with increasing information 
asymmetries accounting figures become less relevant in explaining a firm’s stock market 
return compared to pure cash flow figures. 
 
                                                       
17 Again, note that in the high information asymmetry setting adj. R2 is substantially higher. Additional analyses 
reveal that this does not affect the results discussed above. - 18 - 
 
4.4.  Robustness of results 
I challenge the above results in several ways. First, to deal with the problem of heteroskedas-
ticity I use White-robust t-values. Second, I check variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all my 
specifications in order to check for multicolinearity (all VIFs are below 3.5). Third, while I 
only report results for the extended value-relevance specification in Table 4 and Table 5, I re-
estimate all regressions using the simple value-relevance specification. My results are quali-
tatively robust against these variations. Fourth, I control for the fact that during the sample 
period firms tend to increasingly adopt international accounting standards. I also re-estimate 
all my specifications after adding a dummy variable ACC_LOC taking the value of 1 if the 
firm follows the local (domestic) accounting standard. All my results are robust against this 
variation. For reference, results for the extended base-case regressions are reported in Panel 
A in Table 8 in the appendix.  
Finally, I use three alternative measures of stock market returns as an endogenous variable: 
First, I use a second total shareholder return measure which is calculated over a 12 month 
period starting 5 month after the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year. Second, I use 
two excess return measures calculated as total shareholder return minus return of a buy-and-
hold strategy investing in the CDAX. Results for the extended base-case regressions are re-
ported in Panel B of Table 8 in the Appendix. Again, my results are robust against these vari-
ations.   
 
5.  Summary and Conclusion  
Rappaport’s shareholder value approach claims that managerial decisions are to be judged 
against their effect on shareholder wealth, i.e. their impact on the firm’s stock market per-
formance. Adopting this view the relevant performance measure for managerial accounting 
purposes is total shareholder return to be earned by investments in the firm’s stocks. How-
ever, from the perspective of optimal incentive design using total shareholder return (TSR) 
as a performance measure has a serious drawback, since it is well-known that a substantial 
part of the variation in TSR is due to exogenous events beyond control of the management. 
Thus, although Rappaports shareholder value approach seems widely accepted today, there 
is an ongoing debate about appropriate internal performance measures to evaluate manage-
rial decisions and to be used in managerial accounting. - 19 - 
While some of the modern performance measures used in managerial accounting rely on 
cash flow based figures others try to take advantage of the information content of accounting 
figures. However, whether the additional information content in the accrual components of 
earnings improves the internal performance measurement is an open empirical question. To 
shed light on this question, I examine the correlation of operating cash flows and earnings 
with firm’s total shareholder returns. Using fixed firm effects regression methods for a large 
sample of German listed firms covering some 5,000 firm years, the analysis shows that gen-
erally operating cash flow and earnings are both positively correlated with total shareholder 
return. However, with increasing information asymmetry earnings become less correlated 
with the firm’s stock market performance, and operating cash flow dominates earnings in 
explaining total shareholder return (and vice versa). These results suggest that, from a man-
agerial accounting perspective the information content of accounting figures is only valuable 
in settings characterized by low information asymmetries. In sum, there is no one-size-fits-all 
performance measure for managerial accounting purposes, since shareholders have to trade-
off the benefits due to the information content of accounting figures against the costs arising 
from earnings management, which seem particularly relevant in settings characterized by 
high information asymmetries. 
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ACC_LOCAL Accountingstandard (dummy variable equal 1 if accounting standard followed is German HGB)  TD
ACCRUALS Accruals calculated as EBIT minus OCF TD, own calc
BETA Regression coefficient of a simple market model using monthly market returns (proxied by CDAX returns) TD, own calc
CF CFO deflated by average total assets TD, own calc
CFO Total funds from operations representing the sum of net income and all non-cash charges or credits TD
DOMINATED Ownership structure proxy (dummy variable equal 1 if free float is smaller than 50%) TD, own calc
EAR EBIT deflated by average total assets TD, own calc
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) TD
ETP Earnings before taxes (EBT) deflated by market capitalization TD, own calc
LEV Leverage proxy (total debt deflated by total assets) TD, own calc
MTB Market-to-book ratio of equity TD, own calc
SIZE Firm size proxy (ln of 1+total assets) TD, own calc
TSR Total shareholder retun (measured from month 4 of the corresponding fiscal year to month 16) TD, own calc
TSR_EX Total shareholder retun (measured from month 4 of the corresponding fiscal year to month 16) exceeding the 
corresponding market return (proxied by CDAX return)
TD, own calc
 
The table reports detailed descriptions and data sources of the variables. TD refers to Thomson da-
tabase. 
Table 6: Description of variables 
 
 
YEAR 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
EBIT 61,994 64,149 92,241 42,563 31,469 54,371 80,520 88,899 99,233 120,771 93,621 829,832
EBIT 9.000 5.667 6.723 3.264 1.598 2.289 5.155 4.770 7.581 8.780 7.017 5.517
   EAR (median) 8.2% 6.0% 5.9% 3.6% 2.2% 3.3% 6.0% 6.4% 7.2% 7.4% 5.8% 5.7%
CFO 90,209 89,770 109,529 103,063 115,404 108,465 116,621 119,059 135,437 151,900 136,313 1,275,769
CFO 10.252 7.304 7.305 5.814 4.252 4.510 6.192 6.447 8.615 8.923 9.301 7.069
   CF (median) 10.4% 8.2% 6.9% 5.7% 4.2% 5.8% 7.4% 8.0% 8.3% 8.7% 7.6% 7.5%
Accruals -28,273 -25,591 -17,224 -60,500 -83,959 -54,029 -36,081 -30,153 -36,199 -31,122 -42,548 -445,680
Accruals -0.683 -1.102 -1.697 -3.091 -2.631 -1.940 -0.946 -0.456 -0.519 -0.490 -1.161 -1.284
   ACC (median) -1.6% -2.0% -2.4% -3.1% -3.2% -2.8% -1.8% -1.0% -0.9% -0.7% -1.2% -1.9%
   TSR (median) -11.3% -2.7% -21.1% -30.2% -30.0% 49.7% 6.8% 35.3% 7.1% -18.8% -35.9% -5.5% 
The table reports descriptive statistics of the main variables EAR, CFO, ACC and TSR. Accruals are 
calculated as the difference between operating cash flows (CFO) and earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT). ACC represent standardized accruals, i.e. accruals deflated by average total assets of 
the firm in the corresponding firm year. All other variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in this 
appendix. 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of main variables 
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Dep. Variable:
Constant -0.02 (-2.20) ** -0.01 (-0.95) 1.40 (6.44) *** 1.39 (6.28) ***
EAR 0.65 (6.05) *** 0.69 (6.25) *** 0.51 (3.04) *** 0.51 (2.99) ***
CF 0.60 (3.95) *** 0.54 (3.42) *** 0.51 (2.15) ** 0.51 (2.15) **
BETA(-1) 0.03 (0.90) 0.03 (0.97)
SIZE(-1) -0.26 (-7.02) *** -0.26 (-6.91) ***
MTB(-1) 0.00 (0.59) 0.00 (0.60)
LEV(-1) 0.40 (2.84) *** 0.40 (2.80) ***
DOMINATED 0.09 (2.59) *** 0.09 (2.56) **






Constant 1.40 (6.44) *** 1.26 (5.92) *** 1.30 (6.34) *** 1.43 (6.67) ***
EAR 0.51 (3.04) *** 0.56 (3.30) *** 0.43 (2.54) ** 0.39 (2.24) **
CF 0.51 (2.15) ** 0.52 (2.18) ** 0.45 (1.98) ** 0.49 (2.06) **
BETA(-1) 0.03 (0.90) 0.02 (0.81) -0.01 (-0.54) -0.02 (-0.58)
MTB(-1) 0.00 (0.59) 0.00 (0.66) 0.00 (1.15) 0.00 (1.35)
ETP(-1) -0.06 (-2.85) *** -0.06 (-2.81) *** -0.05 (-2.60) *** -0.06 (-2.51) **
LEV(-1) 0.40 (2.84) *** 0.40 (2.83) *** 0.41 (3.12) *** 0.43 (3.18) ***




















4,565 4,283 2,350 2,344
yes yes yes
Panel B: Two-way fixed effects panel regressions explaining alternative return specifications
TSR TSR
Panel A: Two-way fixed effects panel regressions controlling for local accounting standard
TSR TSR
 
The table reports coefficients and t-values of the robustness tests of my base-case regressions. Panel 
A extends my base case regressions for an accounting standard dummy variable that takes the val-
ue of 1 if the firm follows a local accounting standard. Panel B re-estimates the extended base-case 
regressions using alternative specifications for the endogenous variable. I use two standard total 
shareholder return measures and two excess return measures. Excess return is calculated as total 
shareholder return minus return of a buy-and-hold strategy investing in the CDAX. TSR_44 and 
TSR_55 are standard total shareholder return measures over a 12 month period starting 4 months (5 
months) after the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year. TSR_44_EX and TSR_55_EX are the 
corresponding excess return measures. All other variables are explained in detail in Table 6 in the 
appendix. All specifications include period- and firm-fixed effects. t-values (reported in parenthe-
ses) are White-robust. Statistical significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level, and 10%-level is indicated by 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
Table 8: Robustness of base-case regression 
 
 
 